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Abstract
One argument used by detractors of human embryonic stem cell research (hESCR) invokes Kant's
formula of humanity, which proscribes treating persons solely as a means to an end, rather than as
ends in themselves. According to Fuat S. Oduncu, for example, adhering to this imperative entails
that human embryos should not be disaggregated to obtain pluripotent stem cells for hESCR. Given
that human embryos are Kantian persons from the time of their conception, killing them to obtain
their cells for research fails to treat them as ends in themselves.
This argument assumes two points that are rather contentious given a Kantian framework. First,
the argument assumes that when Kant maintains that humanity must be treated as an end in itself,
he means to argue that all members of the species Homo sapiens must be treated as ends in
themselves; that is, that Kant regards personhood as co-extensive with belonging to the species
Homo sapiens. Second, the argument assumes that the event of conception is causally responsible
for the genesis of a Kantian person and that, therefore, an embryo is a Kantian person from the
time of its conception.
In this paper, I will present challenges against these two assumptions by engaging in an exegetical
study of some of Kant's works. First, I will illustrate that Kant did not use the term "humanity" to
denote a biological species, but rather the capacity to set ends according to reason. Second, I will
illustrate that it is difficult given a Kantian framework to denote conception (indeed any biological
event) as causally responsible for the creation of a person. Kant ascribed to a dualistic view of
human agency, and personhood, according to him, was derived from the supersensible capacity for
reason. To argue that a Kantian person is generated due to the event of conception ignores Kant's
insistence in various aspects of his work that it is not possible to understand the generation of a
person qua a physical operation. Finally, I will end the paper by drawing from Allen Wood's work
in Kantian philosophy in order to generate an argument in favor of hESCR.
Introduction
One argument constantly used by detractors of human
embryonic stem cell research invokes Immanuel Kant's
formula of humanity, the second principal formulation of
the categorical imperative. In the Groundwork of the Meta-
physics of Morals (Groundwork, from hereonin), Kant states
the second principle as follows:
Now I say that the human being and in general every
rational being exists as an end it itself, not merely as a
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means to be used by this or that will at its discretion;
instead he must in all his actions, whether directed to
himself or also to other rational beings, always be
regarded  at the same time as an end... The practical
imperative will therefore be the following: So act that
you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the
person of any other, always at the same time as an end,
never merely as a means [1].
In "The Stem Cell Slide: Be Alert to the Beginnings of
Evil," Michael Novak uses the formula of humanity as the
theoretical ground for rejecting the use of human embryos
for stem cell research. Novak writes:
You must never use a human being as a means for
even the noblest of ends. To use stem cells obtained by
killing living human beings in their embryonic stage is
still using them as a means. It is not enough to say that
the wicked deed has been done – that the embryos
have already been killed. The purpose of that killing
was to obtain the stem cells. One ought not to impli-
cate oneself in that process, not even for the noblest
and most beautiful ends [2].
Of course, Novak cannot literally mean what he says: that
we must never use human beings as means to even noble
ends. To follow Novak's suggestion would be utterly
impossible, given that human beings use each other as
means to several ends all the time. Kant does not pro-
scribe treating persons as a means to an end, rather he
argues against persons treating each other solely as a means
t o  a n  e n d ;  i n  a  m a n n e r  t h a t  c o m p l e t e l y  d e h u m a n i z e s
them. It is certainly permissible for persons to treat each
other as means so long as they are, simultaneously, treating
each other as ends in themselves.a Therefore, I will assume
that what Novak means here is that destroying embryos
for stem cell research completely dehumanizes them and
treats them solely as a means to an end.
In his August 9, 2001 speech to the nation regarding the
federal funding (or lack thereof) of human embryonic
stem cell research, George W. Bush alluded to the formula
of humanity as well when he stated that " [e]ven the most
noble ends do not justify any means... the fact that a living
being is going to die does not justify experimenting on it
or exploiting it as a natural resource"[3]. Similar argu-
ments abound elsewhere in the stem cell literature. Physi-
cian, philosopher, and theologian Fuat S. Oduncu argues
that:
The human embryo is looked upon as a human being
from the moment of its conception and thus attrib-
uted the fundamental principle of human dignity that
guarantees the right to life of the embryo. According to
Kant, human dignity forbids and even condemns
instrumentalization and reduction of a human being
to a mere means and object. Human beings are per-
sons and as such they are ends in themselves... [t]he
mere membership of humanity creates and preserves
the fundamental value of human dignity until death...
[s]ince the living human embryo is the very first con-
crete and individual agent in human development, it
must be regarded as the carrier of implicit and uncon-
ditional values [4].
Jens G. Reich writes that the formula of humanity
"excludes categorically any instrumentalization of a
human being for means other than its own existence, thus
prohibiting procreation of a human embryo solely for sci-
entific or medical purposes" [5]. Paul R. Boehlke invokes
Kant's imperative as well in order to also argue that each
human embryo should be treated as an end in itself and
never as a means only [6].
Each of the abovementioned authors assume a very cru-
cial, yet highly contentious, premise: that when Kant
argues that humanity must be treated as an end in itself,
that he means to denote a biological category, i.e., that
that all Homo sapiens must be treated as ends in them-
selves. Moreover, the arguments above, most explicitly
Oduncu's argument, assume that it is at conception (the
time when a sperm fully combines with the ovum to form
a new and distinct genetic code) that a new Kantian per-
son comes into existence; that the newly conceived
human zygote (particularly, at the blastocyst stage of
development, about five days after fertilization) qualifies
as the type of being to whom the second categorical
imperative applies.
The purpose of this paper is three-fold. First, I will illus-
trate how, in the second categorical imperative, Kant does
not use the term "humanity" to denote a certain biological
category, but rather a certain human capacity, i.e, the
capacity for reason. Therefore, what must be treated as an
end in itself is not necessarily a human being simplicter,
but rather the capacity for reason within a human being.
Second, I will expand on an argument briefly mentioned
by Mark Sagoff in his article "Extracorporeal Embryos and
Three Conceptions of the Human": that it would be diffi-
cult to regard conception, indeed any biological event, as
the exact time when a Kantian person comes into exist-
ence. My purpose in the first two sections of the paper is
largely to illustrate that the ascription of Kantian person-
hood to human embryos from the time of their concep-
tion is more problematic than is assumed by the
abovementioned authors, and thus that they, or anyone
that happens to agree with their contention, need to pro-
vide a better argument to establish this crucial premise. It
is important to note that I am not arguing that human
embryos are definitely not Kantian persons. Rather myPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2008, 3:4 http://www.peh-med.com/content/3/1/4
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goal is much more modest; my main concern is to illus-
trate the difficulties that come with making the claim that
the act of conception realizes a Kantian person in the
world. By doing so, I will, in effect, be throwing the ball
back into the court of philosophers like Oduncu and
Novak; they would need to at least address the difficulties
I pose in this paper before contending that Kantian per-
sonhood applies to embryos from the time of their con-
ception. Lastly, I will appeal largely to Allen Wood's work
on Kantian philosophy in order to sketch a Kantian argu-
ment in favor of embryonic stem cell research.
The Kantian definition of 'humanity' and 'person'
Let us look closer at the exact wording of the formula of
humanity: "act that you use humanity, whether in your
own person or in the person of any other, always at the
same time as an end, never merely as a means."
Kant defines a "person" in the Groundwork not as a mem-
ber of the species Homo sapiens, but rather as a rational
being whose "nature already marks [him] as an end in
itself, that is, as something that may not be used merely as
a means and hence so far limits all choice (and is an object
of respect)" [7]. In the Metaphysics of Morals (Metaphysics,
from hereonin), Kant describes a person as "a subject
whose actions can be imputed to him. Moral personality is
therefore nothing other than the freedom of a rational
being under moral laws" [8]. From these lines alone, it
seems that Kant considered the term "person" to be appli-
cable to beings with certain capacities, rather than to
beings who are members of a certain species. Indeed, it is
notable that, despite his attitude toward nonhuman ani-
mals (which will be explored below), Kant was not
opposed to the idea that there could be nonhuman per-
sons, i.e., nonhumans in possession of a rational nature
[9].
A closer inspection of Kant's use of the term "humanity"
also reveals that he did not use the term in a descriptive
sense to pick out all and only Homo sapiens. Rather, the
term "humanity" denotes a certain capacity or predisposi-
tion in persons.b In Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere
Reason, Kant describes three elements of human nature:
animality, humanity, and personality [10]. "Animality" is
part of human nature simply in virtue of our being live
human  animals, "it is the basis for our fundamental
instinctual drives aiming at self-preservation (the drives
for food, bodily well-being, and so on)" [11]. "Personal-
ity" is the capacity or predisposition that is the source of
our dignity as rational creatures; it denotes our ability to
respect the moral law and perform our duty solely because
of duty's sake (i.e., it denotes our ability to possess a good
will). Kant refers to personality as "the susceptibility to
respect for the moral law as in itself a sufficient incentive of
the power of choice" [12]. As Allen Wood notes: "Kant iden-
tifies personality with autonomy, in the sense of the abil-
ity to give oneself the moral law through reason, which is
the ground of dignity" [13].
According to Kant, "humanity" is also a predisposition or
a capacity, rather than a species denotation, and it refers
to the rational faculties of persons, the ability that persons
possess to follow self-imposed ends. Unlike the capacity
for personality, which contains as part of its definition
respect for the moral law, the capacity for humanity is the
capacity for reason proper, without any explicit reference to
morality.c Although the predisposition for personality is
the source of the dignity of persons, the reason why it is
humanity that must be treated as an end in itself is because
Kant emphasizes that it is rational nature simplicter, not
rational nature being exercised in a certain manner, that
must be respected. In the Metaphysics, Kant writes:
The capacity to set oneself an end – any end whatso-
ever – is what characterizes humanity (as distin-
guished from animality). Hence, there is also bound
up with the end of humanity in our own person the
rational will, and so the duty, to make ourselves wor-
thy of humanity by culture in general, by procuring or
promoting the capacity to realize all sorts of possible
ends, so far as this is to be found in a human being
himself [14].
That is, " [p]reserving and respecting rational nature
means preserving and respecting it in all its functions, not
merely in its moral function of giving and obeying moral
laws. Furthering rational nature requires furthering all the
(morally permissible) ends it sets, not merely in its moral
function of giving and obeying rational laws" [15]. For
example, in the Metaphysics Kant argues that all persons
have an imperfect duty to cultivate one's talents. Kant
writes:
A human being has a duty to himself to cultivate (cul-
tura) his natural powers (powers of spirit, mind, and
body), as means to all sorts of possible ends. – He
owes it to himself (as a rational being) not to leave idle
and, as it were, rusting away the natural predisposi-
tions and capacities that his reason can someday use
[16].
Notice that the duty to the self is to cultivate one's rational
faculties simplicter; Kant makes no mention of cultivating
only one's moral prowess. When it comes to our duties
toward others, Kant also maintains that each rational
being must make the rational (morally permissible) ends
of other persons " [their] own end as well" [17]; the pro-
motion of the ends of other rational creatures is also my
duty. No mention is made that I must respect or promote
other people's ends only when they are related to follow-Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2008, 3:4 http://www.peh-med.com/content/3/1/4
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ing the moral law; I must respect the rational or autono-
mous decision that another person makes because in
doing so, he is exercising his humanity.
Once it is understood what Kant means by the terms "per-
son" and "humanity," the formula of humanity can be re-
phrased as follows: "act that you use the capacity or predis-
position for reason, whether in your own person or in the
person of any other, always at the same time as an end,
never merely as a means." The object of respect in the for-
mula of humanity, therefore, is not a certain biological
species, but rather a certain capacity. Kant reiterates this
imperative several times throughout his writings. In the
Metaphysics, for example, Kant argues that all human
beings are required to "acknowledge, in a practical way,
the dignity of humanity in every other human being.
Hence, there rests on him a duty regarding the respect that
must be shown to every other human being" [18]. Notice
what Kant does not say. He does not just say that we are to
respect the dignity of every other human being. Rather, he
says that we are to respect the dignity of humanity (the
capacity for reason) in every human being and that there-
fore we must respect a human being in virtue of the fact
that he possesses this capacity. If Kant wanted to argue
that we must respect every single member of the species
Homo sapiens as an end in himself, surely the former
method of wording the imperative would have sufficed.
Yet Kant takes pains to always remind us that it is the
humanity  within  human beings or within  persons that
must be respected. That is, what must be respected is the
capacity for reason; the capacity to set ends, follow those
ends, and be an autonomous individual.
Therefore, from the wording of the imperative alone, it is
not true, contra Oduncu, that Kant "condemns the instru-
mentalization and reduction of a human being [qua Homo
sapiens] to a mere means and object" and it is also not true,
from the wording of this imperative alone, that " [t]he
mere membership of humanity creates and preserves the
fundamental value of human dignity until death." The
term "humanity" is not meant to denote a membership in
any group at all, rather it denotes a certain capacity pos-
sessed by all persons, i.e., accountable beings, to reason
and set ends for themselves. One need not be human, in
the biological sense, to be a person, according to Kant.
Thus, the term "person" or "humanity" is not necessarily
tied into the concept of Homo sapiens in Kantian moral
philosophy. From the second principle formulation of the
categorical imperative alone, it cannot be concluded that
mere species membership is sufficient grounds for Kan-
tian personhood, and thus sufficient grounds for dignity
or respect in the sense of not being treated as a mere
means. Therefore, from this alone, we cannot conclude
that human blastocysts are included in Kant's sense of the
term "person" and thus that they must be treated as ends
in themselves.
Nevertheless, the question of whether an embryo or a
fetus may still be counted as a person who possesses the
predisposition or capacity for reason is worth pursuing in
light of other aspects of Kant's writing. Kant did consider
children persons, even if their humanity, their capacity for
reason, and their personality, their capacity to follow the
moral law, are not quite developed. Indeed, Kant refers to
small children as persons who have an innate right to
their parent's care [19] even though small children are not
the type of beings "whose actions can be imputed to
[them]." The correct question that philosophers like
Novak and Oduncu need to ask is whether there are Kan-
tian reasons for thinking that a human embryo or fetus,
from conception, has the capacity for reason as part of its
nature, and therefore that it possesses humanity, even if it
is not a capacity that is currently being exercised.d If so,
perhaps a case can be made that human embryos ought to
be treated as ends in themselves, not because of their spe-
cies membership, but instead because they too possess the
capacity that Kant so adamantly champions as an object
of respect.
The significance of conception and Kant's Third 
Antinomy
Individuals who argue that blastocyst-stage embryos pos-
sess value akin to any other human person usually argue
that this value is acquired at conception. Given that we are
approaching this from a Kantian standpoint, what seems
to be assumed by these individuals is that the moment of
conception (although this is a misnomer, since concep-
tion does not take place in a single moment) realizes a
new being in the world that possesses the capacity for rea-
son as part of its nature and is, therefore, a proper subject
of Kantian moral concern.
Let us take a closer look at Oduncu's argument:
The human embryo is looked upon as a human being
from the moment of its conception and thus attrib-
uted the fundamental principle of human dignity that
guarantees the right to life of the embryo. According to
Kant, human dignity forbids and even condemns
instrumentalization and reduction of a human being
to a mere means and object. Human beings are per-
sons and as such they are ends in themselves... [t]he
mere membership of humanity creates and preserves
the fundamental value of human dignity until death...
the author of these lines proposes to relinquish the
notorious concept of "the person" in order to promote
the clarity and quality of the bioethical debate on the
research with human embryos. Since the concept of
the "human being" is more fundamental, and evenPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2008, 3:4 http://www.peh-med.com/content/3/1/4
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precedes the concept of "the person," the bioethical
debate should be conducted on the grounds of a bio-
logical and anthropological concept of the human
being. The concept of the human being and the inher-
ent value of human dignity related to it may find a
wider acceptance, as it refers to the biological species
of the Homo sapiens sapiens [20].
Here are the following claims that, it seems to me, can be
derived from the above passage. First, Oduncu argues that
the event of conception is responsible for generating a
human being in the world with inherent human dignity.
Given that Oduncu is appealing to Kantian philosophy, I
will assume that his concept of human dignity is akin to
Kant's. Therefore, it seems that what Oduncu means to say
is that the event of conception is causally responsible for
generating a human being in the world that possesses the
capacity for reason; conception is causally responsible for
the genesis of the Kantian person. Indeed, if he does not
think this, he does not give an alternative viewpoint con-
cerning the genesis of the Kantian person. Since he does
not mention any other biological event other than con-
ception, it seems safe to assume that he means to say that
conception is responsible for generating a Kantian person.
Second, it seems clear that Oduncu wishes to equate the
concept of a Kantian person with the species Homo sapiens.
Indeed, he argues that the ethical debate concerning the
moral status of the human embryo "should be conducted
on the grounds of a biological and anthropological con-
cept of a human being." I am not sure what Oduncu
means by "anthropological" here (or whether this is in
harmony with how Kant approaches anthropological
studies), but it does seem rather clear that he wishes to
argue that we should understand the genesis of a human
being, and therefore a Kantian person, as occurring due to
the event of conception.
Oduncu wishes to understand the origins of a Kantian
person via a biological event. The problem, as I will illus-
trate below, is that the capacity for reason, according to
Kant, is a supersensible capacity, given that the possession
of transcendental freedom is a necessary precondition for
possessing this capacity. Therefore, the argument that
must be made by philosophers like Oduncu, in order to
stay true to the Kantian conception of personhood, is that
conception is the moment that realizes, or brings into
existence, a being who possesses the supersensible capac-
ity for reason (albeit, perhaps, in a latent form). Is there
any textual evidence in Kant's philosophy that lends cre-
dence to such a view? Some philosophers have certainly
argued as much, and those arguments are rather impres-
sive and formidable ones.e Mark Sagoff, however, main-
tains quite the opposite. He writes:
It is impossible to attribute moral status to an [extra-
corporeal human embryo] on grounds of its physical
characteristics alone – even when its potential is con-
sidered – because there is no point in the process of
ontogeny at which a scientific finding can be made, as
it were, that a glob of protoplasm is now sufficiently
endowed with moral freedom that it has become a
responsible agent or sufficiently endowed with cul-
tural, aesthetic, and ethical capacities that it has
become a human being [21].
Given that a human embryo is obviously a human being
in the biological sense, I assume that what Sagoff means
here is that mere biological humanity cannot tell us any-
thing about moral humanity; about what it means to be a
person, or when a human being becomes a person. In
other words, although biological humanity is an observa-
ble, physical, trait, Kantian personhood (a being endowed
with "moral freedom that... has become a responsible
agent") is not. In order to support this claim, Sagoff
appeals to Kant's metaphysics of human freedom as dis-
cussed in the Third Antinomy in his Critique of Pure Reason
(first Critique, from hereonin):
Kant, of course, struggled in the Third Antinomy and
elsewhere with the disconnection between the empir-
ical self (the subject of scientific or biological research)
and the intelligible self (the subject of agency, free-
dom, judgment, and thus moral status). Kant under-
stood that from a biological or scientific perspective,
all natural activities (whether of humans or non-
humans, adults, or embryos) have to be explained in
terms of the deterministic freedom-excluding frame-
work of the physical and chemical causality. Kant
believed that to show we can act as moral and cultural
beings – to show that we are not all bound by natural
law as are stones – is already to accomplish a lot and
much more than can be inferred from any biological
or physiological inquiry [22].
Here, Sagoff argues that the aspect of a human being that
possesses moral worth in the Kantian framework, the
rational agent or the "intelligible self," is not reducible to
the natural or "empirical" aspect of the human being. In
what follows, I will offer support of Sagoff's claim by
engaging in an exegesis of Kant's first Critique, along with
other supporting literature.
As discussed in the previous section, although Kant argues
that it is the predisposition for personality that is the
source of human dignity, it is the predisposition for
humanity, the ability to make rational decisions, that
must be treated with respect and as an end in itself.
According to Kant, with the ability to make rational
choices comes another very important feature: freedom.Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2008, 3:4 http://www.peh-med.com/content/3/1/4
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As Wood notes, the possession of the predisposition for
humanity "presupposes a kind of freedom, namely the
ability to resist the immediate coercion of desires and
impulses" [23]. Therefore, the capacity for humanity
entails the possession of freedom, and, as Sagoff argues,
there is much reason to believe that Kant would have
resisted identifying conception, indeed any  biological
milestone, as the precise time when a being endowed with
freedom is realized in the world.
In the first Critique, Kant discusses the problem of free will
versus physical determinism as the Third Antinomy of
Pure Reason. Kant acknowledges that there is a tension
between humans possessing freedom and the fact that
humans are subject to physical causal laws; if all human
action is determined by the latter, then the former does
indeed appear to be impossible. Kant expresses the prob-
lem in the following way:
Suppose there were a freedom in the transcendental
sense, as a special kind of causality in accordance with
which the occurrences of the world could follow,
namely a faculty of absolutely beginning a state, and
hence also a series of consequences; then not only will
a series begin absolutely through this spontaneity, but
the determination of this spontaneity itself to produce
the series, i.e., its causality, will begin absolutely, so
that nothing precedes it through which this occurring
action is determined in accordance with constant laws.
Every beginning action, however, presupposes a state
of the not yet acting cause, and a dynamically first
beginning of action presupposes a state that has no
causal connections at all with the cause of the previous
one, i.e., in no way follows from it. Thus transcenden-
tal freedom is contrary to the causal law ... [24]
Freedom, Kant maintains, cannot be tied with any empir-
ical, natural, phenomenon, for the latter necessarily
entails a determinate chain of causality, while freedom
presupposes no causal determinism. Kant is, in essence,
characterizing freedom in a rather libertarian sense, and
he calls it "transcendental freedom." As Henry Allison
notes, the exercise of freedom, according to Kant, must
"involve an element of spontaneity" [25]; a true exercise
of freedom cannot be causally determined in any sense.
According to Kant, even though all empirical evidence
establishes otherwise, transcendental freedom must exist,
for the fact that persons acknowledge the moral law pro-
vides indirect evidence that this is the case. In the Critique
of Practical Reason (second Critique, from hereonin), Kant
argues that:
... the moral principle, conversely itself serves as the
principle of deduction of an inscrutable faculty which
no experience could prove but which speculative rea-
son had to assume as at least possible... namely, the
faculty of freedom, of which the moral law, which
itself has no need for justifying grounds, proves not
only the possibility but the reality in beings who cog-
nize this law as binding upon them [26].
Our empirical exposure to the world cannot justify assum-
ing the faculty of freedom because the exercise of (the
Kantian notion of transcendental) freedom must be liber-
ated from causal laws, and all experience tells us that
nothing in the empirical world is liberated from causal
laws. Therefore, insofar as human beings are subject to the
empirical world, and insofar as we are natural creatures,
the possession of freedom is impossible. Nevertheless,
freedom must be assumed to exist if human beings recog-
nize the moral law as binding upon them, since the moral
law requires that we follow it independently of what our
desires and inclinations demand. Allison affirms this Kan-
tian connection between freedom and morality in what he
calls the "Reciprocity Thesis... the claim that freedom and
the moral law reciprocally imply one another" [27].
Kant argues that such a tension between freedom and nat-
ural causality can only be resolved once we draw the dis-
tinction between the natural/phenomenal and the
intelligible/noumenal; between what Kant calls the "phe-
nomenal self" (the empirical self) and the "noumenal
self" (the purely intelligible self). Here, Kant argues that
human beings possess a dualistic nature;f  there is an
aspect to human nature that is purely intelligible and
independent from the physical/empirical world. The part
of the human being that is a member of the empirical
world, the phenomenal self, is subject to the causal laws
of nature. However, the intelligible self, the part of a
human being that exercises freedom, cannot be found in
the empirical self, but rather in the noumenal self, the part
of the human being that is independent from the empiri-
cal world and therefore the laws of causality. It is because
humans possess a noumenal side, according to Kant, that
we are able to follow the moral law despite our inclina-
tions and desires. Human beings are not completely ruled
by those inclinations and desires because our reason
allows us to be free of them if we so choose, and we can
follow the moral law simply because we recognize it as
binding on all rational persons. Kant further supports this
dualistic view of human agency in the Anthropology from a
Pragmatic Point of View, where he writes that human
beings have two types of character: " [t]he first is the dis-
tinguishing mark of the human being as a sensible or nat-
ural being; the second is the distinguishing mark of the
human being as a rational being endowed with freedom"
[28].Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2008, 3:4 http://www.peh-med.com/content/3/1/4
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Recalling that a person, according to Kant, is a being
whose actions can be imputed onto him, a person is a
being who possesses this noumenal, intelligible, aspect to
his agency, a person is a "rational being endowed with
freedom." Allison puts it well when he writes:
From this perspective we can impute the actions to an
agent and claim that they ought or ought not to have
been performed. This, Kant suggests, is because in
viewing actions in this manner we are considering
them in relation to "something intelligible," which
stands outside of the temporal order of the phenome-
nal world. This is, of course, the agent's practical spon-
taneity, his capacity to act on the basis of reason,
which is assigned to his intelligible character [29].
A person, according to Kant, is a being that possesses this
transcendental, intelligible, aspect to his character; an
aspect to his character that cannot be reduced to the phe-
nomenal/empirical world. In making this claim, Kant has
effectively argued that a being's personhood is not reduc-
ible to any of his physical aspects, but, rather, that person-
hood belongs to the transcendental, intelligible, aspect of
a human being. Hence, Kant has effectively severed the
attainment of personhood from any physical process or
occurrence. A being's possession of personhood, rather,
can only be understood by appealing to his transcenden-
tal, noumenal, self.
According to Kant, therefore, freedom and autonomy, and
with it the capacity and predisposition for humanity and
personality (given that the latter two contain the former
two as necessary components), are not part of our physi-
cal, empirical, phenomenal, self; rather they are part of
our transcendental, intelligible, noumenal, self. As Allison
puts it, it is only in the idea of the transcendental aspects
of humanity, rather than the empirical aspects of human-
ity, that Kant "provides a model for conceiving of human
choice or agency... Kant's point is that the conceivability
of practical freedom necessarily involves a reference to the
transcendental Idea" [30].
Within Kant's corpus, there is a distinction between tran-
scendental and practical freedom; many Kantian scholars
contend that Kant's ethical writings are more concerned
with the latter rather than the former, and thus that it is
the possession of the latter that is necessary in order for an
individual to be a moral subject from a Kantian perspec-
tive. Kant defines practical freedom in the Groundwork as
the "property of such causality that it can be efficient inde-
pendently of alien causes determining it, just as natural
necessity is the property of the causality of all nonrational
beings to be determined to activity by the influences of
alien causes... [freedom] is not a property of the will in
accordance with natural laws" [31]. Even in his practical
philosophy, Kant considers human freedom (and human
reason) as immune from the influence of inclinations or
empirical laws of causation. Indeed, in the Groundwork
Kant maintains that humans possess dignity in virtue of
their ability to be "free with respect to all laws of nature,
obeying only those which he himself gives and in accord-
ance with which his maxims can belong to a giving of uni-
versal law (to which at the same time he subjects
himself)" [32]. Although practical freedom seems to be
the main concern in Kant's moral philosophy, the afore-
mentioned discussion concerning transcendental free-
dom is far from moot. As Allison's quote above illustrates,
it is not possible to understand the nature of practical free-
dom, according to Kant, without a reference to transcen-
dental freedom. Indeed, in the first Critique, Kant
explicitly maintains that "it is this transcendental idea of
freedom on which the practical concept of freedom is
grounded... the abolition of transcendental freedom
would also simultaneously eliminate all practical free-
dom" [33]. Therefore, the existence of practical freedom is
at least conceptually dependent on transcendental free-
dom, and, like transcendental freedom, practical freedom
involves independence from empirical or natural causal-
ity: "freedom in the practical sense is the independence of
the power of choice from necessitation by impulses of
sensibility" [34] All beings who possess freedom in the
practical sense also possess an intelligible aspect of the
self, the part of the self that is not reducible to the empir-
ical world.
Because Kant argues that human freedom and autonomy
belong to some transcendental realm and not to any
empirical or physical realm, Sagoff seems to be accurate in
his claim that it is difficult to argue, from a Kantian per-
spective, that it is because of conception, an empirical and
physical event, that the transcendental, intelligible, nou-
menal, part of the self, i.e., the person, is also generated.
Essentially, arguing that the empirical event of conception
is responsible for the realization of a new creature in the
world who possesses the supersensible capacity for reason
seems to ignore Kant's dualistic conception of human
agency. At the very least, this renders the transcendental
capacity for freedom and autonomy intimately connected
with the empirical world in a manner that may be too
close for comfort from a Kantian perspective.
One very important line in the Metaphysics that supports
Sagoff's, and my own, reading of Kant is when he argues
that:
... the offspring is a person, and it is impossible to form a
concept of the production of a being endowed with freedom
through a physical operation [35].Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2008, 3:4 http://www.peh-med.com/content/3/1/4
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Conception is a purely physical operation, and here Kant
explicitly states that it is impossible to conclude that a
being endowed with freedom comes into existence from a
purely physical operation. Indeed, Kant is so committed
to the idea that the genesis of a free being cannot be
accounted for by a purely physical occurrence that he even
argues that:
No concept can be formed of how it is possible for
God to create free beings, for it seems as if all their
future actions would have to be predetermined by that
first act, included in the chain of natural necessity and
therefore not free. But that such beings (we human
beings) are still free the categorical imperative proves
for morally practical purposes... [a]ll that one can
require of reason here would be merely to prove that
there is no contradiction in the concept of a creation of
free beings [36].
According to Kant, as is evidenced in the first Critique, the
tension between the existence of beings that are simulta-
neously free and also subject to the deterministic laws of
nature vanishes only with the distinction between the
phenomenal/empirical and the noumenal/intelligible. To
denote conception as the event that is causally responsible
for the existence of a being who is endowed with the pre-
disposition for humanity qua the capacity to make free
and rational choices seems to contradict Kant's above
statement that we cannot understand the production of a
free being from a purely physical operation, and it is cer-
tainly at odds with his conclusion in the Third Antinomy
that we cannot account for the existence of transcendental
freedom by appealing to the phenomenal world.
The following claims should make clearer how an argu-
ment like Sagoff's can be developed and contrasted to
Oduncu's claims about the personhood of the human
blastocyst from a Kantian perspective.
1. A Kantian person is a being who is necessarily endowed
with the capacity for reason.
2. All beings who possess the capacity for reason do so in
virtue of their intelligible/noumenal self; the part of the
self that is transcendentally free.
3. Therefore, all Kantian persons possess the capacity for
reason in virtue of their intelligible/noumenal self; the
part of the self that is transcendentally free.
4. It is impossible to account for the existence of the nou-
menal self by appealing to an empirical event as casually
responsible for its existence (because if we did so, the nou-
menal self would be subject to the causal laws of nature
and would therefore necessarily cease to be part of the
noumenal world).
5. Therefore, from a Kantian perspective, it is impossible
to account for the existence of the person by appealing to
an empirical event as casually responsible for its existence.
6. Conception, being an empirical event, cannot be
appealed to as being causally responsible for the genera-
tion of the Kantian person because this would then render
the Kantian person subject to the causal laws of nature.
This would violate the essential characteristic of a Kantian
person: an intelligible (rather than empirical) being who
is not subject to causal laws and is, therefore, a rational
agent endowed with freedom.
7. Therefore, contra Oduncu, it is not possible to argue,
from a Kantian perspective, that conception is causally
responsible for the creation of a being endowed with the
transcendental, supersensible, capacity for reason.
With all this, Sagoff's argument becomes clearer, and I
believe that it does pose a formidable obstacle for philos-
ophers such as Oduncu and Novak who wish to ascribe
such moral import to the event of conception. It is cer-
tainly at conception that the empirical or material aspect
of a human being begins to exist. However, Oduncu and
Novak seem to infer that the intelligible aspect of the self
is also generated because of conception. Yet, if conception
is causally responsible for the creation of the Kantian per-
son, the intelligible self, then this renders the creation of
the intelligible self, along with the creation of the empiri-
cal self, a physical phenomenon. This means that the
intelligible self would also be subjected to the determinis-
tic laws of nature, would not possess transcendental free-
dom, and therefore would cease to be an intelligible self.
Hence, we simply cannot look towards any empirical
occurrence in order to account for the existence of the
intelligible, noumenal self, the Kantian person. To argue
that conception is causally responsible for the generation
of the noumenal self would be to enslave the noumenal
self to the physical chain of causality that Kant argues it is
necessary that it exist independently of in order to account
for the possibly of freedom, autonomy, and rational and
moral agency. In short, while Oduncu wants to conceive
of Kantian personhood and human dignity as empirical
and biological, Kant's conception of personhood and
human dignity, being so dependent on transcendental
freedom, is supersensible in nature.
It is true that Kant does call the offspring a person, and he
argues that we should regard the "act of procreation as one
by which we have brought a person into the world with-
out his consent and on our own initiative, for which deed
the parents incur an obligation to make the child contentPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2008, 3:4 http://www.peh-med.com/content/3/1/4
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with his condition so far as they can" [37]. Kant also
argues that parents possess this duty "from procreation"
and that "children, as persons, have by their procreation
an original innate (not acquired) right to the care of their
parents [38]. Although Kant maintains that the act of pro-
creation results in bringing a person into the world, this is
not equivalent to arguing that a person exists as soon as
procreation is completed (for example, I can say that "The
act of planting an acorn is one by which we have brought
an oak tree into the world" but this is not the same as
arguing that the oak tree exists as soon as the acorn is
planted). Wood makes this distinction as well in his book
Kantian Ethics:
Of course it is one thing to say that parents should be
thought of as bringing a person into being, and even
that they have duties of care to their offspring from
conception. It is quite a different thing to say that the
offspring is a person from conception onward. The first
two things Kant does appear to say; the third is some-
thing he never quite says [39].
The act of procreation certainly results in the beginning of
a unique genetic code that will constitute a person, but it
need not mean that procreation is the precise moment
when the person is created. It is also possible to account
for the parental duty to one's child from procreation
because it is at procreation when the empirical, phenom-
enal, self begins to exist, and the transcendental aspect of
the child, the being endowed with freedom, cannot exist
without the empirical aspect of the child existing. Thus, in
order to ensure the genesis of the child qua person (as the
being endowed with transcendental and practical free-
dom, and therefore humanity and personality), we must
care for the child qua empirical being, which begins to
exist at procreation. But, again, this is distinct from argu-
ing that it is precisely at procreation when the transcen-
dental aspect of the human being, the part of the human
being that possesses freedom and rational agency, and is
therefore a person, begins to exist.
Finally, I would like to make clear what I am not arguing.
I am not arguing that it is the case that Kantian moral phi-
losophy positively prohibits the ascription of personhood
to embryos. Indeed, Kantian personhood is achieved at
some point in the course of the physical development of a
human being; the acquisition of the intelligible self, per-
sonhood, will no doubt coincide with (but will not be
caused  by) some natural occurrence. It is possible that
some argument can be made in favor of ascribing Kantian
personhood to human embryos using other aspects of
Kant's work. Sagoff maintains, for example, that the ques-
tion of the moral status of the human embryo could be
approached from an anthropological standpoint:
In Kantian terms, a problem like that of the status of
[extracorporal human embryos] belongs to the study
of anthropology. According to Kant (1798/1978), "A
systematic doctrine containing our knowledge of man
(anthropology) can either be given from a physiologi-
cal or pragmatic point of view." The physiological per-
spective "aims at the investigation of what nature
makes of man." Nature makes nothing of man that
provides him moral status or significance. To study
humanity wholly in context of its potential under the
aspect of the biological science – or any science – is to
exclude the normative entirely [40].
Perhaps this may incite Oduncu to argue in favor of the
moral status of the human embryo more from an anthro-
pological standpoint than a biological one. Nevertheless,
philosophers such as he and Novak simply assume, rather
than argue, that a Kantian person begins to exist due to the
empirical event of conception. I have argued that there are
difficulties in making such a claim from a Kantian frame-
work. I am not maintaining that it is impossible to make
some argument in favor of ascribing personhood to blast-
ocysts given a Kantian framework, only that the argu-
ments proposed by these philosophers are fraught with
difficulties that need to be, at the very least, addressed in
some serious fashion. Furthermore, what is also needed is
an argument as to why the beginning of the Kantian per-
son coincides with conception, rather than some other
empirical occurrence (e.g., the occurrence of brain waves
in the human fetus). I now pass the buck back to these
philosophers so that they can address these difficulties.
Some Kantian considerations in favor of 
embryonic stem cell research
In what follows, I will present some Kantian considera-
tions that may favor using embryos for stem cell research.
It should be noted that in this section, I will give some rea-
sons for believing that human embryos are not Kantian
persons (mostly, I will borrow from Allen Wood's inter-
pretation of Kantian philosophy). However, I am open to
revising the argument in light of any possible response I
may receive from philosophers that share Oduncu's con-
tention that human embryos should indeed count as Kan-
tian persons.
Allen Wood argues that Kant's theory is "notoriously... log-
ocentric, by which I mean that it is based on the idea that
rational nature, and it alone, has absolute and uncondi-
tional value" [41]. Wood takes what is usually called the
"restrictive view" of Kant's moral philosophy, i.e., that
Kant means to include only actually rational beings (beings
who possess the current capability to reason) as part of the
moral community. Recall Kant's definition of "person"
above; only actually rational beings can be the type of
beings who exercise freedom and whose actions can bePhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2008, 3:4 http://www.peh-med.com/content/3/1/4
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imputed onto them. Only actually rational beings can
possess and exercise a good will; only they can follow the
moral law with duty being the sole motivator. According
to the "restrictive view," when Kant argues that we must
respect humanity within persons or human beings, he
spoke of respecting the actual capacity to make rational
choices. In this sense, Wood is right when he maintains
that the Kantian notion of humanity "does not refer to
membership in any particular biological species" [42]. As
such, Wood would disagree with Oduncu's contention
that the formula of humanity applies to all human beings
simply qua Homo sapiens.
Kant's insistence that only actually rational or actually
self-conscious beings possess moral status and inherent
dignity is very much reflected in his discussions concern-
ing the moral status of nonhuman animals. In a section in
his Lectures on Ethics entitled "Of Duties to Animals and
Spirits," Kant argues that the reason that we lack any direct
duty toward animals is precisely because they lack self-
consciousness:
...since all animals exist only as means, and not for
their own sakes, in that they have no self-conscious-
ness, whereas man is the end, such that I can no longer
ask: Why does he exist?, as can be done with animals,
it follows that we have no immediate duties to ani-
mals; our duties towards them are indirect duties to
humanity [43].
All seeming duties toward animals are really indirect
duties toward persons; we perform any good action
towards an animal, really, for the sake of other persons,
not for the animal itself.
This does not entail, however, that we are allowed to treat
animals cruelly. In the same section, Kant maintains that
an owner is to care for his old dog that has served him
faithfully throughout many years. The reason is not
because the human would be "in breach of any duty to the
dog, since the latter is incapable of judgment" [44], but
rather because the dog's faithful behavior toward its
owner is, what Kant calls, an "analogue of merit" [45];
given that it strongly resembles the human act of merit, it
should be treated and rewarded as such. The reason we
should do so is not because we owe it to the dog, but
rather it is because when a person is cruel or unkind
toward animals, he "damages the kindly and humane
qualities in himself, which he ought to exercise in virtue
of his duties to mankind. Lest he extinguishes such quali-
ties, he must already practise a similar kindliness toward
animals" [46]. In other words, we should be kind to ani-
mals because doing so instills within us the virtues of
kindness and humaneness, and this, in turn, will help to
ensure that we will act in a kind and humane manner
toward other persons. Cruel actions done onto animals
are sufficiently analogous to cruel actions done onto per-
sons (given that animals are "analogues of humanity") so
that the more we practice the former, the more likely we
are to practice the latter. Nevertheless, although Kant
advocates the humane treatment of animals, he still main-
tains that we have no direct duties toward beings that lack
self-consciousness and rationality, as human blastocysts
do.
Of course, if Kant really does argue that only actually
rational or actually self-conscious individuals are part of
the moral community (and as such that the formula of
humanity only applies to these individuals), this not only
fares badly for nonhuman animals, and human embryos
or fetuses, but also for other members of the community
that we typically deem worthy of moral status, e.g.,
human infants, the senile, or the severely mentally disa-
bled. That is, if Kant's theory really endorses the claim that
only actually rational or self-conscious beings have moral
status, we would have no more duties toward infants and
the severely mentally disabled than we have toward non-
human animals. This would not license us to treat them
cruelly, as it does not license us to treat animals cruelly,
but certainly the formula of humanity would not apply to
them, as it does not apply to nonhuman animals. Moreo-
ver, they would not be regarded as persons with intrinsic
dignity, but rather they would be regard as mere "things":
The fact that the human being can have the "I" in his
representations raises him infinitely above all other
living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person,
and by virtue of the unity of consciousness through all
changes that happen to him, one and the same person
– i.e., through rank and dignity an entirely different
being from things, such as irrational animals, with
which one can do as one likes [47].
Needless to say that if human infants, the elderly senile, or
the severely mentally disabled were regarded as mere
things, to be used as instruments or as a person would
wish, this would indeed be a reason to reject Kant's view
of moral status. It is because of this worry that Wood
argues that Kant himself misinterpreted the very spirit of
his own moral theory; that, if interpreted correctly, some
nonrational human beings certainly should be treated as
ends in themselves even if they technically lack Kantian
personhood.
Wood supports the logocentrism of Kant's moral philoso-
phy, but argues that it need not lead Kant to the conclu-
sion that only actually rational beings are ends in
themselves. This consequence only arises because Kant
also accepts what Wood dubs the "personification princi-
ple," which states that "rational nature is respected onlyPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2008, 3:4 http://www.peh-med.com/content/3/1/4
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by respecting humanity in someone's person, hence that
every duty must be understood as a duty to a person or per-
sons" [48]. That is, according to the personification prin-
ciple, the only way of respecting rational nature is by
respecting persons (human and nonhuman alike) who
are actually rational. However, according to Wood, this is
not the lone way of expressing such respect:
... logocentric ethics, which grounds all duties on the
value of humanity or rational nature, should not be
committed to the personification principle. It should
hold that honoring rational nature as an end in itself
sometimes requires us to behave with respect toward
nonrational beings if they bear the right relations
towards rational nature. Such relations... include hav-
ing rational nature only potentially, or virtually, or
having had it in the past, or having parts of the neces-
sary conditions of it [49].
For example, part of respecting rational nature is respect-
ing its potential within a young child, say an infant, even
if the infant lacks self-consciousness, or the concept of an
"I." As Wood notes, "it would show contempt for rational
nature to be indifferent to its potentiality in children, and
to treat children as mere things or as a mere means to the
ends of those beings in whom rational nature is presently
actual" [50]. That is, although young children are not,
strictly speaking, Kantian persons, their potential rational-
ity bears the "right relation" to actual rationality, so that
they must be treated as ends in themselves, partially in
order to ensure that their rational nature is cultivated and
honed.
Wood draws an analogy between what he proposes here
and the way in which traditional theists worship God.
Such worship does not entail only worshipping God Him-
self, but also behaving in certain ways toward other
beings. It is often said that by behaving beneficently
toward our fellow humans, by forgiving their trespasses,
and by loving one's neighbor, one is also serving God.
This is because fellow human beings "stand in certain sali-
ent relations to God, such as being his creatures or being
made in his image. These relations to God which make
our conduct toward them expressive of our love for and
devotion to God" [51]. Likewise, Wood argues, proper
respect towards rational nature need not be limited to
respecting only actual human persons:
Of course we should respect rational nature in per-
sons, and this means respecting the persons them-
selves. But my main argument here depends on saying
that we should also  respect rational nature in the
abstract, which entails respecting fragments of it or
necessary conditions of it, even where these are not
found in fully rational beings or persons" [52].
As a result of this contention, Wood concludes that a rea-
sonable interpretation of Kant's notion of respect for
rational nature entails that small children or individuals
with mental impairments may not be treated as mere
things, or mere instruments; that they also be treated as
ends in themselves. These individuals should be regarded
as persons in the extended sense, rather than in the actual
sense. Neglecting to respect these human nonpersons as
ends in themselves illustrates:
...contempt for rational nature... Kant's principle
might even dictate giving priority to [the] develop-
ment [of rationality] in children over promoting some
of the ends of actual rational beings. It might, for
example, require adults to devote scare resources to
protecting, caring for and educating small children,
instead of using these resources to satisfy their own
contingent ends. Similar points might be made about
respecting rational nature in people who have tempo-
rarily lost it through disease or injury. It would show
contempt for rational nature not to care about them,
and to do nothing to help them recover their rational
capacities [53].
Given that Wood has eroded what he takes to be a central
(but misguided) tenet of Kantian moral philosophy con-
cerning who possesses moral status, could Wood's expan-
sion apply to human embryos? If we are willing to
broaden Kant's conception of the moral community to
make room for children and individuals with mental
impairtments, because these individuals also deserve to
be treated as ends in themselves given their salient rela-
tionship to rational nature, can we not broaden it further
to include human blastocysts? I would anticipate that phi-
losopers like Novak and Oduncu may present such a chal-
lenge.
It is hard to tell how widely Wood means to broaden the
moral community. He does not offer any necessary or suf-
ficient conditions for when potential rationality ought to
be regarded as an end in itself. Nevertheless, I doubt he
means his expansion to cover human blastocysts, given
that Wood does briefly criticize speciesism and maintains
that it is no more morally defensible than racism:
Being a member of a certain biological species, as
many animal rights advocates correctly point out, is
not a sufficient reason; if we try to justify it by the fact
that they are members of our species, then this seems
no more justifiable than (and objectionable for pre-
cisely the same reasons as) giving certain people spe-
cial status because they are members of our race or
nationality [54].Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2008, 3:4 http://www.peh-med.com/content/3/1/4
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In Kantian Ethics, Wood argues that "to regard all humans
as persons because they are members of our species seems
no better than regarding as persons only those who share
our nationality or religion or skin color. To argue that cer-
tain entities are persons because they are members of a
rational species, when they are not in fact rational beings,
is no better than arguing that children are already human
adults because they belong to a species whose mature
members are human adults" [55]. It seems rather clear,
then, that Wood does not mean to include human blasto-
cysts in the moral community, given that they are, in
essence, newly fertilized eggs that are very early in devel-
opment. Indeed, at this stage they have not even devel-
oped into the embryo proper and the embryonic auxiliary
tissue, and their individuality qua human beings has not
yet been established (given that twinning or even chime-
ras can take place until approximately fourteen days post-
conception). Therefore, although Wood does argue that
potential rationality can bear a salient relation to actual
rationality, so that beings who possess the former may
still be treated with the dignity of the latter, he does not
argue that embryonic potential is sufficient for fulfilling
this salient relation. This does not entail, however, that
the human blastocyst is not worthy of any respect at all; I
intend to show below that there is a manner in which they
can be respected even if they are indeed used for research
purposes.
The reason Wood argues this is because a human embryo
or fetus possesses one trait that infants and children do
not in terms of their potential rationality: an embryo or (a
pre-viable) fetus cannot develop into an infant without
the use of a specific person's womb. Thus, to bestow upon
them the extended status of full personhood, even though
they are not technically persons in the Kantian sense, may
entail that some actual persons, i.e., women who have
made the rational, autonomous, decision not to gestate,
would be instrumentalized and treated as mere means
rather than as an ends in themselves. If we are to respect
the rational nature within Kantian persons, this entails
that "rational beings should not be subjected to deception
or coercion" [56]. According to Wood, if bestowing
extended personhood onto beings that are not technically
persons results in violating the dignity of actual persons,
then proper respect for rational nature does not necessi-
tate that we grant that extended personhood. Wood
writes:
... consider the question of whether a fetus, like an
infant, is to be regarded as a person in the extended
sense. The question should turn not only on whether
our conduct duly respects the value of the (still merely
potential) personhood (in the strict sense) of the fetus,
but also on whether it duly respects the dignity of
actual persons in the strict sense – in particular, the
dignity of the person in whose body the fetus is devel-
oping. If that person is forced to bear a child she does
not want, or if her right to control the life process
going on in her body is coercively restricted by oth-
ers... then their conduct expresses extreme disrespect
for the right of rational nature in her person [57].
There are currently approximately half a million frozen
embryos leftover in fertility clinics across the United States
of America. To regard those embryos as persons would
mean that as much as possible must be done to bring
those embryos into fruition, especially since prolonged
exposure to freezing temperatures may compromise their
viability and potential, and therefore would effectively ter-
minate them. This may entail implanting those embryos
into the uteruses of women, whether or not they desire to
gestate the embryos (at least until ectogenesis becomes a
reality, in which case the embryos could be gestated with-
out the use of a woman's womb). As Wood rightly points
out, however, such an action would disrespect the actual
capacity for humanity that women possess. If "granting to
embryos and fetuses the same "right to life" that is
thought to belong to persons in the extended sense would
involve such coercive or invasive conduct, then it would
constitute a gross disrespect to rational nature to grant
them that status" [58].
I believe that Wood's overall argument is correct, but the
question remains, then, how should  we treat human
embryos from a Kantian perspective? What would a Kan-
tian argument in favor of embryonic stem cell research
look like? In order to adequately address this issue, I think
we should adhere to Wood's standards for answering
questions of this sort:
[it] depends on how far our conduct... expresses due
respect for the dignity of rational nature, and how far
it falls short of this... [i]t is relevant to the right answer
to such questions not only how we are acting toward
rational nature in our treatment of human beings who
are not persons in the strict sense, but also whether in
our conduct we duly respect this value in those who
are persons in the strict sense [59].
Even though human embryos are potential persons to
some extent, once they are slated for destruction at fertility
clinics, their potential has effectively vanished.g As Ted
Peters and Gaymon Bennett write, embryos that reside in
a Petri dish or in a frozen state possess some of the neces-
sary traits that would enable them to grow into infants,
but they lack one very important one: they do not inhabit
the proper environment that would facilitate their growth
into persons:Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2008, 3:4 http://www.peh-med.com/content/3/1/4
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As many supporters of embryonic stem cell research
have rightly pointed out, the argument from potenti-
ality assesses the status of the embryo in accordance
with the presumption that the embryo can and will be
placed in vivo. The potential for an embryo in the lab
to become a baby is nil. This is not a criticism, moral
concession, or an argument from geography (as critics
rhetorically put it). It is an ethically relevant fact. An
embryo in vitro has many intrinsic qualities that are
needed for baby making, but it does not have all of the
necessary qualities. Although it has DNA, at minimum
it still needs a womb to proceed down the develop-
mental pathway [60].
Therefore, the following is the appropriate manner of
looking at the embryonic stem cell research debate
through the lens of a Kantian framework: If we must
decide between discarding surplus embryos in fertility
clinics (and by "surplus," I mean that the embryos have
no possibility of being implanted into a womb; their
genetic parents do not wish to implant them themselves
and they refuse to give permission to allow the embryos
to be adopted) or using them for very promising research,
which of these two options most "expresses due respect
for rational nature?"
The same fate that befalls nonhuman animals seems to
befall human embryos in this regard. Given that they are
not currently self-conscious nor rational beings (indeed,
they have not even developed the necessary neural appa-
ratus to have any thought or sentience whatsoever),
because their potential to develop into persons has effec-
tively vanished once they are slated for destruction, and
because granting them extended personhood would
entail a gross disrespect of actual personhood, they can be
used as means to the ends of persons. But, does this mean
that we can use them in any which way we choose? That
does not follow from Kant's philosophy any more than
the wanton treatment of animals follows.
John Robertson writes that in vitro embryos are symboli-
cally very powerful. Even those embryos that are slated for
destruction and "will not be placed in the uterus have
some meaning in this regard, for they operate as a symbol
of human life or constitute an arena for expressing one's
commitment to human life" [61]. In Kantian terms,
embryos can be said to be "analogues" to human persons,
and certainly there is "some value in the potential person-
hood of an embryo or fetus" [62]. After all, Kant may have
argued, our empirical, phenomenal, self did begin at con-
ception (or shortly thereafter, if one believes that irrevers-
ible individuality is necessary for the existence of the
empirical self. If one does believe this, the empirical self
may not come into existence until the twinning/chimera
stage has passed). Because they are such analogues, they
do seem to deserve some esteem in this regard, if only to
find a way of respecting their symbolic value.
Such respect is certainly not being manifested with our
current treatment of embryos at fertility clinics. It is diffi-
cult to see how incinerating them or flushing them down
a drain at fertility clinics expresses respect for rational
nature, especially since the outcome to doing this may be
to compromise the advancement of a kind of research that
can indeed benefit so many rational beings. Moreover, it
is inconsistent to invoke the formula of humanity as an
argument against the moral permissibility of embryonic
stem cell research but not against the moral permissibility
of current In Vitro Fertilization (IVF) techniques in the
United States of America, which deliberately produce
more embryos than will be transplanted into a uterus for
possible implantation. Embryos are being regarded solely
as a means to an end here; they are created and then used
for no other reason other than to produce infants for oth-
erwise infertile couples. In the very same speech where
Bush argues that we should not treat embryos as mere
means for our scientific ends, he lauds IVF practices for its
role in relieving infertility. To truly treat embryos as ends
in themselves would require a cessation of current IVF
techniques in the United States of America so that more
embryos are not overproduced and later destroyed. Until
we are willing to do this, however, we cannot use Kant's
formula of humanity as a definitive argument against the
moral permissibility of embryonic stem cell research if we
are unwilling to apply the same criticism against current
IVF techniques. Surely if we are willing to instrumentalize
embryos in order to relieve infertility, which is classified
as a disease, we should be willing to instrumentalize them
to help in the fight of alleviating other debilitating dis-
eases. It is not at all clear to me that embryos may be
instrumentalized in order to treat the disease of infertility,
but that they cannot be instrumentalized in order to treat
Alzheimer's disease, Parkinson's disease, spinal cord inju-
ries, retinal deterioration, or diabetes. Certainly alleviat-
ing the former disease is a worthy cause, but not much
more than alleviating the latter five (amongst the many
other afflictions that embryonic stem cell research has the
potential to treat).
Elsewhere, I have argued that using embryos for stem cell
research, like using anencephalic infants as organ donors,
is far more respectful than letting their lives go to waste at
the bottom of drains in IVF clinics. If we want to treat
embryos as analogues to persons, we should try to treat
them in a way that, at least, cultivates our character so that
we can better regard our fellow persons, as Kant said we
are to do with nonhuman animals. Flushing embryos
down a drain does not at all cultivate such a character, but
using them for stem cell research may.Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2008, 3:4 http://www.peh-med.com/content/3/1/4
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Using human embryos for research will allow scientists,
and us as a society, to engage in and endorse a practice
that has as its intent the hope of curing many painful dis-
eases, for example, Alzheimer's disease, which progres-
sively eradicates our rational faculties. Certainly it respects
rational nature to strive to find cures for certain diseases
that destroys rational nature; it does not seem far-fetched
to argue that, from a Kantian perspective, respecting
humanity or rational nature would entail attempting to
preserve it in the face of disease. Indeed, recall Wood's
point that it would be disrespectful to the disintegrating
rational nature in persons afflicted with disease to do
"nothing to help them recover their rational capacities." It
seems to me that discarding surplus embryos at fertility
clinics, rather than using them for research that may aid in
the cure of a disease like Alzhiemer's, seems to run danger-
ously close to doing just that.
Moreover, by alleviating human suffering and disease, we
are fulfilling our duty of beneficence toward others (a
duty that Kant acknowledges we all possess), and we are,
in a sense, taking on the ends of the sick and diseased as
part of our own ends (for I am sure that part of their ends
is to find relief from, and cures for, their afflictions).
Nothing of this can be achieved if we continue to wan-
tonly create and discard embryos for use in fertility treat-
ments, and certainly we are not treating embryos in any
respectful manner or regarding them as Kantian persons
by doing so. As long as we are willing to instrumentalize
embryos for IVF purposes, consistency demands, from a
Kantian perspective at least, to use them for stem cell
research in order to further the health and improve the
lives of actual persons.
Endnotes
a) Many thanks to Dr. Allen Wood for pointing this out
via e-mail correspondence.
b) There can be controversy here regarding what Kant
means by the term "capacity" or "predisposition." If Kant
means to use the term "capacity" in order to denote cur-
rent capabilities, so that a typical adult human has the
capacity for reason given that he can do so at the current
time if he so chooses, then obviously human fetuses and
embryos do not have the capacity for reason, given that no
fetus nor embryo possesses the current capability to rea-
son. Allen Wood, for example, perhaps would interpret
Kant's use of the term in this way, given that, as we will see
later in the paper, Wood does make a distinction between
beings who actually possess the current capability to exer-
cise rationality and beings that have the potential to be
rational (such as fetuses and neonates); he refers to the
former as beings who possess rationality in the "techni-
cal" or "strict" sense and the latter as beings who possess
rationality in the "nontechnical" or "extended" sense.
Other philosophers, however, may interpret Kant's use of
the term "capacity" to mean "potential," so that the
human embryo or fetus does possess the capacity or the
predisposition for reason because it possesses this poten-
tial given that it consists of a healthy human genetic code.
In this paper, given that I side with Wood on various
points, I will also side with him concerning Kant's use of
the term "capacity," although I recognize that this is a
reading that is very much open to debate; to enter this
debate, however, would take me beyond the scope of my
objective here.
c) The distinction between humanity and personality can
be interpreted as being more of a difference in emphasis
than in kind. Although the predisposition for humanity is
defined as the capacity for reason proper and the predispo-
sition for personality is defined as the capacity to follow
the moral law, the capacity for reason proper entails the
capacity for autonomy as a necessary precondition, which,
in turn, entails the capacity to engage in moral actions.
Therefore, the two ought not to be looked upon as com-
pletely distinct capacities or predispositions, rather their
differences can be viewed as focusing on different aspects
of our general capacity for reason and to be autonomous
beings. I would like to thank to one of my anonymous
reviewers for pointing this out to me.
d) This method of argumentation would assume, there-
fore, that Kant means to use the terms "capacity" or "pre-
disposition" in order to denote the potential to reason,
rather than to denote the current capability to reason.
Although I am siding with Wood's interpretation of
"capacity" and "predisposition" here, I will illustrate in
what follows that there are difficulties in supporting the
view that Kant would maintain that the capacity or predis-
position for humanity is present from the moment of con-
ception, regardless of how one chooses to define these
terms. More precisely, because the capacity for reason is
intimately connected with transcendental freedom, the
capacity for reason, from a Kantian framework, is a super-
sensible capacity, and it is difficult to illustrate, using
Kant's philosophy, that a supersensible capacity can be
instantiated in the world due to a natural event, e.g., con-
ception.
e) See Patrick Kain, 'Kant's Defense of Human Moral Sta-
tus'. Kain's view seems to heavily depend on Kant having
a certain teleological conception of human nature, i.e.,
that all human beings, from the origin of their organisms,
are ensouled with the nature that is common to their spe-
cies. This would mean that the embryo has the capacities
and predispositions of humanity and personality from the
genesis of the human organism, which can be denoted
either at conception or irreversible individuality, which
takes place at approximately fourteens days post-concep-Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2008, 3:4 http://www.peh-med.com/content/3/1/4
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tion. If the latter is when one takes the human organism
to be formed (when twinning is no longer possible and
cleaving has ceased), then this poses no obstacles for the
moral permissibility of human embryonic stem cell
research, given that in vitro blastocysts are five-days-old
and will never reach the stage of irreversible individuality.
Nevertheless, Kain's argument seems to conflict with
other philosophers who argue that Kant did not have any
teleological view of human nature; that he did not believe
that a human being possesses "an essence which defines
his true end".
f) This dualism is not to be interpreted as a type of sub-
stance or Cartesian dualism. While there is reason to
believe that Kant argues in favor of the existence of an
immaterial soul that makes up our essential identity, we
cannot derive this thesis from the discussion here alone.
g) Such a view is akin to the Jewish conception of the
moral status of extracorporeal embryos. For example, in
his testimony to the National Bioethics Advisory Com-
mission, Rabbi Elliot Dorff, Ph.D. argues that extracorpor-
eal embryos have no legal or moral status outside the
womb under Jewish law because " [o]utside of the
womb... they have no such potential" to become persons.
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